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This study evaluates the prevalence of earnings management to avoid losses and earnings 
decreases across the World. This practice was first documented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
for United States firms from 1976 to 1987. We replicate their study for a more recent and global 
sample. Firms that do not seem to manage earnings do avoid reporting earnings decreases, but we 
found persistent evidence of earnings management to avoid reporting losses. The results are 
consistent across different geographical regions, countries, and before and after International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Unlike Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), however, 
we were not able to find evidence on which components of earnings (cash flow from operations, 
changes in working capital, or other accruals) firms mainly manage to increase earnings, 
concluding they likely use a bundle of all these components. Our results are important mainly to 
financial analysts and general investors, who should be careful in giving good prospects to firms 
who presented small profits since they are likely small losses artificially managed to look better, 
a practice widely spread across time and geographical regions among IFRS adopters and non-
adopters. 
 
Keywords: Earnings Management. Small Loss Avoidance. Global Sample. 
 
VERÔNICA DE FÁTIMA SANTANA 
Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP) 
Address: Avenida da Liberdade, 532 | Liberdade | 01502-001 | 





RAQUEL WILLE SARQUIS 
Universidade de São Paulo (FEA-USP) 
Address: Avenida Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908 | Butantã | 






Edited English.  
 
Received on 2/19/2021. Reviewed on 4/26/2021. Accepted on 5/25/2021 by the Prof. PhD Sérgio Murilo Petri (Editor-Chief) and 
Prof. PhD Sandro Vieira Soares (Associated Editor). Published on 6/11/2021. 
 
Copyright © 2021 RCCC. All Rights Reserved. It is allowed to quote part of articles without prior authorization, provided that the 
source is identified. 






Revista Catarinense da Ciência Contábil, ISSN 2237-7662, Florianópolis, SC, v. 20, 1-20, e3153, 2021 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we aim to evaluate the prevalence of earnings management to avoid losses 
and earnings decreases across the World. This practice was first documented by Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) for United States firms from 1976 to 1987. The authors found that while the 
statistical distribution of earnings is smooth across different intervals, there is a considerably 
greater frequency of firms presenting small profits than firms presenting small losses, arguing that 
earnings distribution should be also smooth in the zero thresholds. They also found evidence of a 
higher frequency of small earnings increases than of small earnings decreases. Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) argue, then, according to further analyses, that firms manage their operations to 
avoid disclosing small losses and earnings decreases, believing this would displease investors. We 
replicate Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) analysis for a global sample relative to a more recent 
period.  
While after Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), many studies explored this issue investigating 
specific elements related to it (see, e.g., Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Beaver, McNichols, 
& Nelson, 2003; Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2003), as well as its consequences (see, e.g., Burgstahler 
& Eames, 2003; Kerstein & Rai, 2007a), there is no study investigating the prevalence of the 
practice of earnings management to avoid losses and earnings decreases across the World. That is, 
across different cultural and legal contexts, different regions, and under different accounting 
standards. This gap is what we aim to fill. Consequently, we may expect to find different results 
when analyzing different economic, social, and political environments than Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997). 
Despite recent developments concerning sustainable and socially oriented practices, 
business academics and practitioners still emphasize that companies’ primary objective is to 
deliver profits to their shareholders. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) bring anecdotal evidence that 
strong incentives avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. They show, then, empirically, that 
this seems to be the case, showing firms managing their operations to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases and losses. A few years later, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) include the small loss 
avoidance measure in a global sample analyzing the role of investor protection to earnings 
management practices, but since they use a compound index to measure earnings management, 
they do not provide evidence on the prevalence of this specific practice across the World. 
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) follow a similar path as Leuz et al. (2003), studying small 
loss avoidance alongside other earnings management measures, focusing on the IFRS effects for 
Australia, France and the United Kingdom. The authors find that IFRS is not associated with 
decreases in the practice of earnings management to avoid losses. More recently, Lee, Shin, Vetter, 
and Kim (2017) find the zero threshold discontinuity pattern for Korean firms, while Kim, Kim, 
and Zhou (2017) uses the same measure as Leuz et al. (2003) for a sample of 21 countries from 
2002 to 2011, relating earnings management practices to language. Therefore, this is an earnings 
management variable widely used in the recent accounting literature. However, there is no ample 
evidence of its prevalence around the World. 
This gap is what we aim to fill. We analyze a sample of 38,388 listed non-financial firms 
from 116 countries for 1996 to 2017, the last period available at the time of data collection, 
yielding a total of 426,697 observations. We follow Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) methods, 
analyzing the histograms of firms’ earnings and changes in earnings scaled by total assets. We 
found a much larger frequency of earnings between 0% and 0.5% of total assets than the frequency 
of earnings between −0.5% and 0% of total assets, indicating that firms likely practice earnings 
management to turn minimal losses into minimal profits. We found no consistent evidence of 
earnings management to avoid earnings decreases, however. We also found firms with higher 
levels of the beginning of the year current assets and current liabilities and more likely to manage 
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earnings to avoid small losses, but we could not find if they manipulate cash flows, changes in 
working capital, or other accruals to achieve this. 
Our results are significant for three main reasons.  
1. We complement the accounting literature by providing ample evidence of the small 
loss avoidance practice across the World since the previous literature focus either 
on specific countries and periods or bundle it with other earnings management 
measures.  
2. Our findings are important to financial analysts and general investors because we 
emphasize caution in giving positive prospects to firms that presented small profits.  
3. Analyzing a global sample is crucial because we show this is a considerably spread 
practice across the World, even among different economic and financial market 
development levels. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 brings a brief literature review, and Section 3 
describes our sample and methodology, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Section 4 
discusses our results and, finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We based this study on the Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) and the Economic Theory 
of the Firm, which argue that a firm is a nexus of contracts between different agents and accounting 
is an integral part of the contracts that define the firm (Coase, 1937; Scott, 2015; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Given this vital role that accounting plays in establishing and monitoring the 
contracts that define the firm, accounting practices have economic consequences, and managers 
will choose accounting practices in their own best interest. Therefore, the PAT is concerned with 
predicting actions, such as the choice of accounting practices by managers and how they will 
respond to proposed new accounting standards (Scott, 2015). 
The PAT comprises two different perspectives: (i) the efficiency perspective and (ii) the 
opportunistic perspective (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Under the efficiency perspective, 
managers choose accounting practices to minimize the firm’s agency cost and, therefore, increase 
the efficiency of contracts and the firm value (Holthausen, 1990; Scott, 2015; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Under the opportunistic perspective, managers can choose accounting 
practices according to their utility functions, even if it reduces firm value and survival chances 
(Scott, 2015; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The literature on earnings management, therefore, is 
based on this opportunistic perspective of the PAT. 
Lo (2008, p. 350) argues that earnings management is one of the most provocative research 
topics in accounting and finance, given that it explicitly involves “wrongdoing, mischief, conflict, 
cloak and dagger, and a sense of mystery”. Therefore, the author suggests that we should analyze 
the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator (Lo, 
2008). 
For several years, there were many studies on earnings management in accounting and 
finance. In 1985, for example, Healy (1985) discussed the effect of bonus schemes on accounting 
decisions since managers would tend to select specific accounting procedures that increase their 
compensation. Similarly, Jones (1991) analyzes earnings management during import relief 
investigations, and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) investigate managers’ accounting 
choices in firms with persistent losses and dividend reductions. Following, Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) provide evidence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Finally, 
using accruals as proxies for earnings management, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) evaluate 
the suitability of several accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. 
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More recently, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) review the literature on earnings quality, 
discussing proxies, determinants, and consequences of earnings quality. The authors argue that 
“higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s financial 
performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker” (Dechow 
et al., 2010, p. 344). The definition of earnings quality proposed by Dechow et al. (2010) has three 
essential features: (i) the concept of earnings quality is meaningless without the context of a 
specific decision model; (ii) in order to be of higher quality, earnings must be informative about 
the firm’s financial performance; and (iii) we determine earnings quality not only based on the 
relevance of firm’s financial performance but also on the ability of the accounting system to 
measure performance (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Regarding proxies for earnings quality, Dechow et al. (2010) review over 300 studies and 
then classified the proxies into three categories: (i) properties of earnings (earnings persistence, 
accruals, earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness, and timely loss recognition, and target 
beating); (ii) investor responsiveness to earnings (earnings response coefficient and the R2 from 
the earnings-return model); (iii) external indicators of earnings misstatements. 
Some of these proxies, especially those related to earnings properties, are also used as 
metrics for earnings management. There is a negative relationship between earnings management 
and earnings quality, given that earnings management tends to erode earnings quality (Dechow et 
al., 2010). In this context, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) define that “earnings management 
occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers”. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find firms engage in earnings management actively 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports, specifically, to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases and losses, since the earnings manipulation occurs mainly via cash flows. Therefore, 
firms delay expenses and anticipate revenues to disclose better earnings. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) focus on a U.S. sample for 1967 to 1987. Leuz et al. (2003) 
analyzed this earnings management measure and several others, creating an aggregate earnings 
management score for a global sample for 1990 to 1999, investigating the role of investor 
protection. Other studies explore this measure of earnings managements proposed by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) (Dechow et al., 2003; Beaver et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 2003; Kerstein & Rai, 
2007a, Kerstein & Rai, 2007b). Dechow et al. (2003), for example, investigate whether the 
manipulation of discretionary accruals could explain this phenomenon of too few firms reporting 
small losses and too many firms reporting small profits. However, the authors were unable to 
confirm this relation. Phillips et al. (2003) provide evidence that deferred tax expenses are more 
valuable than total and abnormal accruals to detect earnings management to avoid earnings decline 
or a loss. In addition, Kerstein and Rai (2007a) argue that the incentives to turn small losses into 
small profits are higher in the fourth quarter. Therefore, the previous literature focused on 
explaining the practice of earnings management to avoid small losses and earnings decreases, so 
that a demand for a more recent and broad scope analysis, mainly in a context of global 
convergence to the IFRS, issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
remains. We aim to fill this gap. 
Earnings management is still an important research topic in accounting and finance, 
although the most recent studies use different perspectives. Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic 
(2019), for example, argue that earnings is a dynamic process and, therefore, the authors propose 
a dynamic model of earnings management that takes into account the time-series properties of 
earnings. In addition, Kim et al. (2017) explore the relationship between the grammatical structure 
of languages and earnings management, and, finally, Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, and Chtioui (2018) 
assessed how the presence of female directors affect earnings management. In Brazil, there are 
also several studies on earning management under development using different approaches, such 
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as Cunha and Piccoli (2017), Consoni, Colauto, and Lima (2017), Paulo and Mota (2019), Santana, 
Santos, Carvalho Júnior, and Martinez (2020) and Santos, Guerra, Marques, and Júnior (2020). 
 
 
3 SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
The data comprises 38,388 listed firms from 116 different countries from 1996 to 2017, 
the last period available at the time of data collection. The data is from Compustat, collected via 
the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). The sample comprises firms from all but the 
financial sector, as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). We included only firms with positive equity 
and market capitalization. Table 1 shows the number of total observations from each region 
(according to the World Bank classification). The vast majority of the sample comes from East 
Asia and the Pacific, followed by Europe and Central Asia, North America, South Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and then by Sub–Saharan Africa. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Distribution by Region 
Region Number of Observations 
East Asia and the Pacific 207,172 
Europe and Central Asia 90,313 
North America 76,700 
South Asia 22,418 
Latin America and the Caribbean 13,462 
Middle East and North Africa 10,443 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,189 
Total Sample 426,697 
 
Figure 1 shows the sample distribution across countries, geographical regions, and over the 
years. In East Asia and the Pacific, Japan and, in later years, China dominates the sample. In 
Europe and Central Asia, the country with the most significant number of observations is the 
United Kingdom, followed by France, Germany, Italy, and Greece. Several countries in the region 
have observations only in the last half of the sample. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil 
has the most significant number of observations, followed by Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Israel has 
the most significant number of observations in the Middle-East and North Africa region. The 
United States dominates the North American sample, but Canada also has a considerable number. 
India dominates the South Asia sample, especially in the latter half of the sample, and South Africa 
has the most significant number of observations from the Sub-Saharan Africa region. 
We computed the earnings variable as the net income scaled by the beginning of the year’s 
total assets. All other variables in the subsequent analysis are scaled by total assets as well. 
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), earnings management to avoid losses is likely to be 
reflected in the empirical distribution of earnings in the form of a much lower frequency of small 
losses than small profits. 
In the absence of earnings management, minimal profits should be as likely as a minimal 
earnings increase. However, suppose a firm will present a slight loss in a given year, such as 0.25% 
of its total assets. Since investors look for firms with positive Earnings per Share (EPS), this firm, 
in particular, may, for instance, delay an ad campaign to decrease its expenses and make a minimal 
profit instead of a minimal loss. It is an example of real earnings management. This firm may also 
manage earnings via discretionary accruals, abusing the subjective discretion inherent to 
accounting estimations. For instance, it may delay recognizing a provision to the following year, 
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decreasing its recognized expenses. Analogously, the same procedures may occur to turn small 
earnings decreases into small earnings increases since investors prefer firms with increasing EPS. 
Therefore, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we test the hypotheses of earnings 
management to avoid losses and earnings decreases according to graphical evidence in the form 
of histograms of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of the earnings scaled to total 
assets to test for the presence of earning management to avoid losses. Analogously, we analyze 
the empirical distribution of the scaled earnings variations to test for earnings management to 
avoid earnings decreases. 
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Figure 1. Sample Distribution 
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Further, we test for ex-ante and ex-post evidence of the methods with which firms engage 
to manage their earnings, also in line with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). The ex-ante evidence 
stands on the firms’ current assets and current liabilities at the beginning of the year. The authors 
explain that firms with high levels of current assets and current liabilities (relative to total assets) 
are likely to find it easier to manage earnings since they have a more considerable margin for 
working capital manipulation. If it is so, firms with minimal profits (firms more likely to have 
managed earnings) should have considerably more significant levels of current assets and current 
liabilities than firms with minimal losses (firms less likely to have managed earnings). The ex-
post evidence, in turn, stands on decomposing earnings into three different components to analyze 
which of them is manipulated. Again, as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we decompose earnings 
into (i) cash flow from operations, (ii) changes in working capital, and (iii) other accruals. 
Therefore, the methodological approach we follow in this study is a positivist one, focusing 
on empirical evidence of earnings management practices obtained via data description and 




4.1 Prevalence of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses: earnings, 
changes in earnings, current assets and liabilities, cash flow from operations, changes in working 
capital, and other accruals. On average, both earnings levels and earnings changes amount to 0.5% 
of total assets. The positive average earnings are composed of positive cash flow and changes in 
working capital that amount to 6,2% and 1.8% of total assets, respectively, and negative other 
accruals. On average, half of the firms’ total assets are current assets, and the total current liabilities 
represent around 30% of total assets. There is considerable variation in all the variables even after 




  N Min Mean Max Std. Dev. 
Earnings 426,697 −0.893 0.005 0.351 0.166 
Earnings Changes 426,524 −0.549 0.005 0.662 0.134 
Current Assets 419,362 0.040 0.513 0.979 0.234 
Current Liabilities 419,342 0.014 0.309 0.799 0.180 
Cash Flow from Operations 424,930 −0.612 0.062 0.431 0.139 
Changes in Working Capital 409,977 −0.472 0.018 0.907 0.171 
Other Accruals 408,445 −1.169 −0.077 0.427 0.202 
All variables are scaled by the beginning of the year total assets and winsorized at 1%. 
 
Figure 2 shows our replication of Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) Figure 1, depicting the 
histogram of earnings changes from −0.15 (−15% of total assets) to 0.15 (15% of total assets) at 
0.25% intervals. Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) Figure 1 shows a break in the zero thresholds, 
indicating, as the authors hypothesized, a greater frequency of small earnings increases relative to 
small earnings decreases, indicating firms manage earnings avoid disclosing earnings decreases. 
Here, however, the distribution is very smooth across all intervals, including at the zero thresholds. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that firms manage earnings for the more recent global sample to 
avoid earnings decreases. Figure 2 also indicates no different patterns across geographical regions 
since there is no apparent discontinuity for the distributions for different colors. 
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Figure 2. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases 
Number of observations: 426,524 
 
The Accounting literature shows different patterns of earnings management among 
emerging and developing countries and different legal systems (see, e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Francis, 
Hasan, & Li, 2016; Doupnik, 2008). Thus, we investigate whether separating by legal systems 
yields different results. Using information from the World Bank, we classified countries among 
three different legal systems: civil law, common law, and pluralistic and other systems (including 
mixes of civil, common, and Islamic law). Figure 3 shows the results, also indicating geographical 
regions by colors, in which one also cannot find any discontinuity around the zero thresholds. 
Therefore, regardless of legal systems, no evidence that firms manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases is found. Separating the sample by income level (classification from the World Bank) 
also yields no different results (unreported, for the sake of space). 
  
 
Figure 3. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases (by legal system) 
Each plot’s caption shows the number of observations 
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We also performed an independent analysis by country. We selected the countries with the 
most significant samples and analyzed them individually, as presented in Figure 4, showing 
countries’ legal systems classifications. Again, we found no unusual behavior. We also analyzed 
the distribution of earnings changes per year, but the results (unreported, for the sake of space) 
also do not show evidence of the abnormal frequency of small earnings increases and decreases. 
 
Figure 4. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases (by country and legal system) 
Each plot's caption shows the number of observations 
 
The Accounting literature also shows earnings quality (measured, for instance, as earnings 
management) is related to better quality financial information (see, e.g., Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 
2013; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & 
Verdi, 2008; Li, 2010; Tarca, 2012). Therefore, we also analyze whether the adoption of the IFRS 
seems to affect the practice of earnings management to avoid earnings decreases. To do so, we 
separate the sample among IFRS adopters and non-adopters (again, also considering the legal 
systems’ classifications). The IFRS adoption variable is built according to hand-collected data on 
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the IFRS Foundation website (IFRS Foundation, 2018) in August 2018, in which we examined all 
the 166 available jurisdiction profiles at the time. We consider a particular firm in a specific 
country as an IFRS adopter from the year in which it mandatorily applied the international 
standards on its consolidated financial statements according to the country’s financial regulation. 
Figure 5 shows the results. Since, again, no discontinuity can be observed around the zero 
thresholds, we conclude there are no differences between IFRS adopters and non-adopters, even 
after considering different legal systems. 
Therefore, we show systematic evidence of no practice of earnings management to avoid 
reporting earnings decreases. This result is significant because it shows firms from different 
contexts and periods from Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present different behavior regarding this 
earnings management practice. 
 
 
Figure 5. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases (by IFRS adopters and non-
adopters and by legal system) 
Each plot's caption shows the number of observations 
 
4.2 Prevalence of earnings management to avoid losses  
Next, we move to the practice of earnings management to avoid losses. Figure 6 shows our 
replication of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)’s Figure 3, depicting the histogram of earnings levels 
from −0.35 (−35% of total assets) to 0.35 (35% of total assets) at 0.5% intervals. Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997) Figure 3 shows a clear break at the zero thresholds, indicating, as the authors 
hypothesized, a greater frequency of small earnings relative to small losses, indicating firms 
manage earnings to avoid disclosing losses. We find the same result. Therefore, for the more recent 
global sample, which comprises firms from different contexts and periods than those analyzed by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), there is also strong evidence that firms manage earnings to avoid 
reporting small losses. Figure 6 also indicates that this pattern is repeated across different regions 
since the discontinuity is seen across the different depicted colors.  
 
 






Revista Catarinense da Ciência Contábil, ISSN 2237-7662, Florianópolis, SC, v. 20, 1-20, e3153, 2021 
 
Figure 6. Earnings Management to Avoid Losses 
 
Figure 7 shows the analysis considering firms from countries with different legal systems. 
The break in the zero thresholds is evident regardless of the legal systems’ classification, showing 
that managing earnings to avoid losses is shared among different legal contexts. Unreported results 
(for the sake of space) also show the pattern among firms in countries with different income levels. 
Figure 8 shows the analysis considering the countries with the most significant samples (also 
depicting their legal system classification), and we can see this practice is widely spread among 
them since the histograms show clear breaks at the zero thresholds. We also analyzed the evidence 
of small loss avoidance across the World per year, but the (unreported, for the sake of space) 




Figure 7. Earnings Management to Avoid Losses (by legal systems) 
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Each plot's caption shows the number of observations 
 
Figure 8. Earnings Management to Avoid Losses (by country and legal system) 
Each plot's caption shows the number of observations 
 
Finally, we also analyzed whether adopting the IFRS could have affected this practice, 
separating the sample between adopters and non-adopters, as when analyzing earnings 
management to avoid earnings decreases. We also consider countries’ legal systems. However, as 
Figure 9 shows, there is no difference in the pattern of earnings distributions between the samples 
of adopters and the samples of non-adopters. 
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Figure 9. Earnings Management to Avoid Losses (by IFRS adopters and non-adopters and by 
legal system) 
Each plot's caption shows the number of observations 
 
4.3 Ex-ante and ex-post evidence on the methods of earnings management to avoid losses 
The results show a clear pattern of earnings management to avoid disclosing small losses, 
turning them into small profits. The evidence is consistent among different geographical regions, 
legal systems, over time, and between IFRS adopters and non-adopters. Following Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), we examine the ex-ante and ex-post evidence on the methods firms use to 
conduct such practice. For the ex-ante evidence, we evaluate the firms’ beginning of the year 
current assets and liabilities. If firms with higher levels of current assets and current liabilities find 
it easier to manage earnings to turn small losses into small profits, we expect firms that presented 
small profits to have begun the year with higher levels of both current assets and current liabilities. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examined the distribution of beginning of the year (pre-
manipulation) current assets and current liabilities conditional on the level of earnings. To do so, 
they built portfolios of 1,000 observations, each parting from the zero thresholds towards positive 
earnings and then towards negative earnings. Then, they calculated the first quartile, the median, 
and the third quartile of current assets and current liabilities for each portfolio, plotting the values 
against the median values of earnings for each portfolio. The authors’ Figures 5 and 6 show the 
amount of pre-manipulation current assets and current liabilities jump higher for the first positive 
earnings portfolio and return to their trend in the following portfolios. Since the first portfolio is 
more likely comprised of firms that managed earnings to avoid losses, they conclude these firms 
indeed find it easier to do so when they have higher levels of current assets and current liabilities. 
We conduct the same analysis, but we build the earnings portfolios consisting of all 
observations in the equally-spaced earnings intervals shown in Figure 6. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) suggest this approach, but it results in too much variation because the portfolios are too 
small. Since we have much more observations than Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), our analyses 
were not a problem. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of Current Assets Conditional to Earnings 
 
Figure 10 shows the results of this analysis. From negative decreasing earnings toward 
zero, the level of current assets decreases, and the levels of current liabilities increase. The trend 
reverts from zero towards increasing positive earnings levels. Most important, as in Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), the first positive earnings portfolios show a prominent jump in the level of 
current liabilities, reverting fast in the following portfolios. The current assets also increase after 
the zero thresholds, but not so prominently and not so fast reverting. 
Therefore, results show that firms with higher levels of, mainly, current liabilities find it 
easier to manage earnings to avoid losses. Thus, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found that the ex-
ante methods are still valid for our sample, which comprises firms from different contexts and 
periods. We also run the analysis using the 1,000 observations portfolios presented by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), and the conclusions remain the same (unreported results for the sake of space). 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Cash Flow, Changes in Working Capital, and Other Accruals 
Conditional to Earnings 
 
Next, for the ex-post evidence, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we decompose 
earnings into three components: (i) cash flow from operations, (ii) changes in working capital, and 
(iii) other accruals. We calculate the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile of each of 
these components for each of the earnings portfolios and plot their values against the portfolios’ 
median earnings. The results are in Figure 11. In general, cash flow from operations increases with 
increasing earnings, faster when earnings are positive. Changes in working capital behave 
similarly, but they tend to be negative for firms with losses and to grow slower for profit firms. 
Other accruals tend to be negative. Negative accruals become less negative for smaller losses, 
becoming more negative for more significant profits. Positive accruals decrease with growing 
earnings. This behavior is consistent with other accruals being negatively correlated to cash flow, 
as pointed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find a sharp increase in cash flow from operations for firms 
with small profits relative to firms with small losses, concluding that firms manage their operations 
to increase earnings, also increasing their cash flows. When analyzing the accruals, they find a 
simply mirroring behavior, arguing that firms do not resort to managing earnings to avoid 
disclosing losses. They find no evidence for the changes in working capital distribution. Therefore, 
the authors conclude that their sample firms resort to real earnings management to avoid reporting 
losses, turning them into small profits. 
However, Figure 11 shows no unusual behavior of neither variable around the zero thresholds, 
even if we analyze (unreported results) separately by region or year. We also analyzed earnings 
divided into gross and operating income, but we found no results. Therefore, we cannot find 
evidence on the ex-post methods firms from the more recent global sample use to manage earnings 
to avoid reporting losses. Dechow et al. (2003) found that firms do not use discretionary accruals 
to conduct this earnings management practice, suggesting they should rely on real earnings 
management. However, we could not specifically separate the evidence regarding accruals or cash 
flows, not being able to classify the practice between accruals or real earnings management. They 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study aimed to search for evidence of earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses across the World, replicating Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) study for a 
more recent and global sample, incorporating firms from different cultural and legal contexts as 
well as from different periods. We found persistent evidence of earnings management to avoid 
reporting losses, but we found no consistent evidence of earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases. Next, we found that firms with the beginning of the year current assets and, mainly, 
current liabilities are more likely to manage earnings to avoid losses, consistent with Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997).  
However, we could not find evidence on which components of earnings (cash flow from 
operations, changes in working capital, or other accruals) firms mainly manage to increase 
earnings. It is our main limitation. Future research, therefore, could explore this issue further, 
evaluating, for instance, the role of specific earnings components, such as deferred taxes, as in 
Phillips et al. (2003), loss reserves, as in Beaver et al. (2003), and the role of interim reports, as in 
Kerstein and Rai (2007a). Future research can also explore the consequences of this earnings 
management practice, such as Kerstein and Rai (2007b), who explored Earnings Response 
Coefficients (ERC). Notwithstanding, our results are important for both the Accounting literature 
and for the practice. We extend the literature bringing evidence of the small loss avoidance 
earnings practice for firms in the different cultural and legal contexts, different regions, and under 
different accounting standards. It is also important to notice that, since we analyzed different 
economic, social, and political environments, different results from Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
could be expected. We share one of their main conclusions: firms manage earnings to avoid 
reporting small losses. Our results are important mainly to financial analysts and general investors, 
who should be careful in giving good prospects to firms who presented small profits, since they 
are likely small losses artificially managed to look better, a practice widely spread across time and 
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